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martes, 26 de mayo de 2015

GUYANA SE QUEDA CON LA BOCA DEL ORINOCO Y NO PASA NADA?

GUYANA SE QUEDA CON LA BOCA DEL ORINOCO Y NO PASA NADA?

ESTIMADOS AMIGOS, GUYANA DIO CONCESIONES EN EL AREA DE LA BOCA DEL ORINOCO, ES DECIR EL DELTA QUE ES GIGANNTE Y FALTA EL ESEQUIVO QUE ESTA MAS LEJOS, Y DIO CONSECIONES QUE NOS CIERRAN EL PASO AL ATLANTICO, Y AQUI NADIE DICE NI PIO, NI RECLAMA NADA, SON CONSECIONES PARA EXPLOTAR PETROLEO Q NO SABEMOS SI ES UNA EXTENSION DE LA FAJA O DEL CAMPO GIGANTESCO DE PETROLEO EN MONAGAS/ANZOATEGUI DEL FURRIAL, MUSIPAN, DE VENEZUELA, POR LO QUE SE HACE URGENTE Q SE TOMEN MEDIDAS PUES GUYANA LO QUE HIZO ES ASEGURAR SU SOBERANIA SOBRE EL MAR NUESTRO DE LA BOCA DEL ORINOCO. NI SIQUIERA ESTA EN  JUEGO EL ESEQUIVO, ESO ESTA MAS LEJOS, ELLOS ESTAN AHORA EN NUESTRO TERRITORIO MARITIMO, PROPIO, Y CON LOS LIMITES ACORDADOS DE VENEZUELA CON TRINIDAD NOS CIERRAN LA SALIDA AL ATLANTICO TOTALMENTE. 
EL DR ANIBAL MARTINEZ, ES EXPERTO EN ESTAS AREAS, TANTO DE PETROLEO COMO DE TERRITORIO  PROPIO DE VENEZUELA EN ESTA ZONA , CONSULTENLE Y VERAN Q ES PEOR LA SITUACION DE LO Q SE VE.  
EL PAIS SERIO RECLAMA AL GOB Q DEFIENDA NUESTRO TERRITORIO, SINO PASARAN A SER VENDEDORES DEL PAIS, TAL COMO HICIERON CON LA GOAJIRA HACE ANOS YA, Q TODA ERA NUESTRA, Y AHORA POR LA POBRE NEGOCIACION ES DE COLOMBIA, AL PAIS LO VAN SAQUEANDO DE TERRITORIOS Y DE DIVISAS, %, Q VAINA TAN ARRECHA ES ESTA PLAGA. SALUDOS, 
NESTOR G RAMIREZ
MIAMI, FLORIDA, USA,  15 DE MAYO 2015.

informe muy interesante sobre las reservas internacionales de Venezuela. info privado de latinvest Venezuela.


LATINVEST Venezuela Weekly Report
Page 2
But, the situation is worse than that. The
BCV calculated that it had $14.62 billion
in gold using a price of $1,257.80 per
ounce. (The BCV uses a trailing 9
month average; see BCV Footnote 3.3).
The silver lining in this growing disaster
is that the 9 month average has slipped
slightly since December 31, so that
Venezuela may have less gold and thus
more “other” in its till.
The IMF created SDRs as an international reserve asset
in 1969 to supplement all members’ reserves. Members
are allowed to count the SDRs as part of their reserves
and Venezuela is able to borrow those assets at an
extremely favorable rate of interest (currently 0.05%,
which frankly is much better than the over 30% that
Venezuela is paying on some of its bonds). In 2009 as
countries around the world were reeling from the
worldwide economic crisis, the IMF decided to provide
member nations a total of US$250 billion in SDRs to
shore up international liquidity. At that time, the IMF
gave Venezuela 2.543 billion SDRs, which works out to
about $3.578 billion in US dollars (The SDR value
floats against a basket of the US dollar, the yen, the
euro, and the pound, with 1 US dollar currently worth
0.710769 SDR). Thus, the 276.6 million in SDR chips
that Venezuela borrowed last month is worth
approximately US$385 million.
As chart 2 indicates, that leaves Venezuela with 1.982
billion SDRs which is approximately US$2.79 billion in
special drawing rights at today’s exchange rate.
(Rumors in financial circles began to swirl that
Venezuela was withdrawing more SDRs this month –
but we have been unable to confirm that and barring an
uncharacteristic revelation from Venezuela, we will
have to wait until the May IMF report to see if
Venezuela withdrew further funds). (Ed Note: You can
find out more about the IMF’s SDRs in the Latin
American Herald Tribune’s (LAHT) document library
here. And just to set the record straight, Venezuela,
while withdrawing the money generously provided for it
by the IMF, is still not on the best of terms with the
organization and has NOT submitted to what is known
as an Article IV consultation in over 9 years).
The remaining US$2.79 billion in SDRs is important
because Venezuela includes that as part of its reserves
total of $17.526 billion. Subtracting those remaining
SDRs from the reserves leaves Venezuela with
approximately $14.736 billion in reserves.
And here is why we start to get down to fumes. In its
Annual Financial Statement, Venezuela’s Central Bank
(BCV) reports that the value of the gold it was holding
on 31 December 2014 was $14.620 billion (You can see
the original BCV Footnote 7 – which is pictured
above – as well as all the rest of the BCV Financials
footnotes here).
So, if we just used the BCV’s 31 December 2014
gold calculations, Venezuela would have just $120
million possibly liquid in its reserves, outside of the
gold and SDRs.
But the situation is worse than that. The BCV
calculated that it had $14.62 billion in gold using a
price of $1,257.80 per ounce. (The BCV uses a
trailing 9 month average; see BCV Footnote 3.3).
The silver lining in this growing disaster is that the
9 month average has slipped slightly since
December 31, so that Venezuela may have less gold
and thus a couple hundred other million in its
reserves.
The bad news is that the price of gold has fallen.
Backing the figures out means that Venezuela has
approximately 11,624,019 ounces of gold. Gold has
slipped since last year and closed yesterday at
$1205.30, meaning that if Venezuela had to sell its
LATINVEST Venezuela Weekly Report Page 3
gold today, it would theoretically realize just $14.010 billion, $600 million less than its December valuation. The worse news is that some of Venezuela’s gold reserves may have already been mortgaged, so raising even that $14 billion may not be possible. Reports that Venezuela had completed a deal with some Wall Street banks where it borrowed against its gold have been circulating for the last few months (and years), although there has been no official confirmation (nor denial) from Venezuela nor any of the banks reportedly involved. A similar deal was done by Ecuador with Goldman Sachs in June of 2014 where President Correa acknowledged borrowing $600 million for 3 years against Ecuador’s gold holdings. But the worst news is that we do not know the exact make-up of the reserves. In an effort to shore up the floundering reserves in December of 2014, Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro issued a decree that “diamonds, other precious stones and metals” would also now be included in the country’s reserves, so Grandma’s silver may now be included (BCV note here).
Of course, the lack of transparency is not just a problem for figuring the real liquidity available, it is a problem for much of Venezuela’s economic numbers. By law, the Central Bank is required to provide the numbers for inflation in the first 10 days of every month. It has not done that all year.
In fact, the BCV has published neither total inflation nor GDP figures for 2014. Nor has Venezuela published scarcity of products figures in over a year under the maxim that it is better to be thought horrible than to open the books and prove it.
Sadly, the numbers are indeed horrible – we estimate that inflation is now running at 165%, best exemplified by the rocketing black market exchange rate. That rate went from 300 to over 400 in the span of the past week. On February 25, it took 200 bolivars to buy one dollar. Yesterday it took 423. The dollar doubled against the bolivar in just 3 months. It previously took 5-1/2 months for the dollar to double from 150 on November 28, 2014, to 300 on May 13. And before that, it took the dollar almost 11 months to double against the bolivar from 75 in January 2014 to that 150 in November 2014. The rate of decay in the currency and the resulting pass-on of inflation is gathering speed exponentially, as revealed by the increasingly parabolic nature of the currency graph below.
Two things are driving the increasingly rapid deterioration in the currency. One is the shortage of dollars brought on by the failure to increase oil production (and especially exports) and then the fall in oil prices; the country’s heavy dependence on imports for almost everything as Chavez’s policies gutted and then Maduro’s policies finished off most domestic production; and finally, Chavez’s doubling of the country’s foreign debt during the five years following the world economic crisis of 2008 to over $80 billion – often at usuriously high interest rates.
That debt is becoming a tremendous drag on the country’s resources and is increasingly responsible for much of the foreign reserve drain. As we outlined in “Venezuela: The Emperor Has No Clothes” in December in the Financial Times, Venezuela has over $11 billion in foreign debt payments this year, including a $5 billion bulge in October and November. This month alone, Venezuela and PDVSA had to pay $1.234 billion in interest. In April, Venezuela had to
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50
100
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200
250
300
350
400
450
6-23-2010
11-8-2010
4-5-2011
7-29-2011
11-19-2011
3-12-2012
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11-24-2013
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10-22-2014
2-11-2015
LATINVEST Venezuela Weekly Report
Page 4
pay $755.7 million. What is exceptionally worrying is that even though Venezuela completed ALL its May bond payments by the 17th, the reserves have continued to tumble. The next interest payment is June 1 for $35 million on the $1 billion of Venezuela 7% bonds of 2018, but fortunately June and July are comparatively light months. August ramps up to $750 million, however.
At the same time as the country is experiencing the increasing unavailability of dollars, the government is also repeatedly doubling the supply of bolivars circulating in the economy. As the chart above indicates, Venezuela M2 money supply is up 69% in 12 months to 2.34 trillion bolivars from 1.385 trillion bolivars in May of 2014. In 2008, M2 was just 147.64 billion, meaning that the amount of bolivars in circulation is 16 times what it was 7 years ago in 2008 when Venezuela’s oil basket hit a high of US$126.46 a barrel. In simple economic terms, Venezuela has too many bolivars chasing too few dollars.
A Long Hot Summer
The net effect of these problems is manifesting itself throughout Venezuela’s import dependent economy as shortages become rampant. Sadly, we outlined the beginnings of the shortages back in 2013 both before the Council of the Americas (we have the dubious distinction of being the first to point out the toilet-paper shortage in January 2013, video here) and in “Venezuelans Wake Up to Economic Realities” in the Financial Times in April 2013. Since then, things have only gotten steadily worse.
As Venezuela enters what promises to be a long, hot summer, citizens are being forced to wait for 4-6 hours in lines to purchase the few consumer staples that supermarkets may have. At the same time, their salaries are increasingly worth nothing as spiraling devaluation continues to decimate any bolivar earnings.
Venezuela’s minimum salary -- which the majority of the population live on -- will be raised to 7422 bolivars a month on July 1. At the black market rate of 400 bolivars to the dollar, that 7422 is just $18.56 a month, putting Venezuela below even Cuba in average wage. As a result,Venezuelans have no choice but to wait in line to get price-controlled food.
But even those making a relatively great salary of four times the minimum are still making less than $75 a month. At that wage, citizens can only buy what is for sale in Venezuela and travel outside of the country is essentially impossible – if you could find plane tickets, which are both very expensive and in short supply as airlines have drastically cut service to Venezuela because the government could not change increasingly worthless bolivars into dollars.
Add to the widespread shortages and economic deprivation the fact that there are now regular blackouts because of power shortages (electricity shortages so great that the government has had to cut the workday to now end at 1:30!) and homes and apartments are regularly going without water for days at a time because of municipal water shortages, and you have a recipe for civil strife over a long, hot, dirty summer.
Unlike the magical realism that allowed Hugo Chavez to create a reality distortion field in Venezuela for so long, Nicolas Maduro must be one of the few leaders to invent an economic war and go on to lose it.

lunes, 25 de mayo de 2015

info de italianini en twitter, IMPORTANTE S/ DESARROLLO DEL GAS EN PARAGUANA Y ORIENTE..

aqui las cosas no estan claras ni transparentes, en el caso del desarrollo del gas en paraguana hay q aclarar q pasara con el condensado, o sera ese el caramelo para los socios pues nadie va a producir gas sin tener ingresos en $, o sera q hay gato enmochilado? tambien, en gas de oriente siempre ha sido pura promesas incumplidas, hace falta aclarar q pasa con ese desarrollo hay mucho por hacer en redes domesticas de las ciudades del oriente, pues ni siquiera se ha empezado y este es el eslabon mas lento, pues toma mucho tiempo, y ni siquiera se ha empezado, tambien estan las demas necesidades incumplidas como las plantas de generacion electrica q usarian gas, su sistema de distribucion del gas, y las necesidades de guayana. tambien en guayana asi como piensan hacer el orinoco mas traficable porque no piensan q GUYANA nos esta quitando la salida al ATLANTICO desde el ORINOCO y no se ve accion del gob. hace falta un frente fuerte en ese sentido pues al perder el acceso al atlantico se cortan las posibilidades de exportar por esa zona q es ventajosa para venezuela en cuanto se refiera a la faja y a los desarrollos de guayana, y por ultimo la necesidad de mano de obra especializada, y gerencia efectiva y eficiente q no se ve por ningun lado, sin esto ultimo todo esfuerzo sera NULO. saludos y esperemos q se hagan bien las cosas.

jueves, 21 de mayo de 2015

Precios del crudo no son suficientes para pagar importaciones

Precios del crudo no son suficientes para pagar importaciones

La firma japonesa Nomura señala que los ingresos petroleros no parecen para alcanzar cancelar las compras externas y los compromisos de deuda 

Los actuales precios del petróleo “no son lo suficientemente altos para financiar las importaciones y los pagos de deuda”, señala la firma asiática Nomura en su más reciente informe sobre Venezuela. Dice que la situación es aún más problemática para el país dada la imposibilidad de acudir a los mercados para pedir dinero prestado y por la escasa inversión extranjera directa.
También se refiere a la merma de las reservas internacionales del Banco Central de Venezuela: “El hecho de que las bóvedas con las joyas de la abuela estén muy cerca de agotarse tampoco ayuda”.
Nomura advierte que ante la ausencia de una política de ajuste se requiere que el precio del petróleo aumente, lo que no se perfila a corto plazo. “Cuando todos los precios en la economía —excepto el dólar oficial y la gasolina— aumentan rápidamente, los precios del petróleo deben subir lo suficiente para compensar el impacto fiscal negativo que producen las políticas del gobierno”.
Indica que si la inflación, junto con la caída del salario, continúa acelerándose como ha estado sucediendo durante el gobierno de Nicolás Maduro, el precio del crudo tendría que subir más rápido. Sin embargo, reitera que esta realidad luce lejana.
¿Recuperación económica? La firma no espera cambios en la política económica. Basa su presunción en el hecho de que el gobierno debe afrontar en los próximos meses unas elecciones legislativas. A pesar de que el presidente Maduro aseguró el martes que tiene la segunda parte del plan de recuperación económica listo y que será anunciado con más detalles en los próximos días, Nomura muestra escepticismo: “Confesamos que nos hemos perdido la primera parte del plan de recuperación económica”.
En cualquier caso, indica la firma, estos anuncios podrían significar una profundización de la actual política en vez de un cambio.
La autorización del aumento de 50% de sueldos de los maestros ilustra los desbalances de la economía. “Si los salarios se incrementan a esta tasa y el dólar para la importaciones básicas se mantiene en 6,30 bolívares por dólar, cuánto tiene que aumentar el precio del petróleo para compensar el impacto fiscal y externo de esta medida”.
Nomura se pregunta qué sucedería si la escasez continúa creciendo y el gobierno llega a un punto en el que debe escoger entre seguir usando el tipo de cambio de 6,30 bolívares por dólar para importar bienes, pagar las obligaciones de deuda o cambiar radicalmente su política. La firma no se atreve a hacer pronósticos y se limita a indicar: “Salvo que haya una expresión de malestar social, no vemos preocupación para el pago de deuda en 2015”. Añade que más bien piensan “que el gobierno llegará a un momento crítico camino a 2016”.

Exxon Mobil asegura que hallazgo de petróleo en la Zona en Reclamación “es significativo"

QUIEN PODRA DEFENDER NUESTRA PATRIA ?

SALUDOS ......FRGR
---------- Mensaje reenviado ----------
De: ramirez <nesgram@gmail.com>
Fecha: 20 de mayo de 2015, 19:42
Asunto: q desastre amigos, vean linea roja como nos quita el atlantico, y es al delta q lo quita, no al esequivo...q pena.
Para:

este anuncio es  para nosotros en este pobre rico pais, q pena damos, estamos ante un espectaculo dantesco de venta de la patria, q lastima. saludos, nestor

Exxon Mobil asegura que hallazgo de petróleo en la Zona en Reclamación “es significativo"

Noticias
VTV/ Archivo
VTV/ Archivo
Miércoles, Mayo 20, 2015
La compañía petrolera estadounidense, Exxon Mobil, reveló este miércoles que el descubrimiento de petróleo en la Zona en Reclamación entre Guyana y Venezuela, “es significativo”.
A través de un comunicado, la compañía dijo que descubrió “más de 90 metros de reservas petrolíferas en arenisca en el sitio de perforaciones conocido como el bloque Stabroek”.
Vea también: Aseguran que Venezuela podría perder soberanía en buena parte de su territorio por disputa con Guyana
Esta área está a 192 kilómetros de Guyana y es reclamada por Venezuela como parte de una larga disputa territorial. Exxon Mobil y el gobierno de Guyana informaron el pasado 7 de mayo el hallazgo, aunque no ofrecieron mayores detalles.
Señalaron que siguen evaluando la viabilidad comercial del lugar para su explotación, aunque según citan el presidente de esta corporación, Stephen Greenlee, “está alentado” por los resultados del primer pozo en el bloque.
Le puede interesar: Machado critica que Guyana explote petróleo hallado en Esequibo: "Maduro, esto se llama traición a la patria"

Redacción NTN24 Venezuela 

viernes, 15 de mayo de 2015

las reservas de crudos livianos y medianos se agoto. y empezamos a importar crudos argelinos.....



Miami 27 de julio del 2012

REVISION DE LA INFORMACION DE PDVSA SOBRE RESERVAS DESARROLLADAS DE CRUDOS LIVIANOS, MEDIANOS Y PESADOS DE SU INFORME  DEL 2011

Revisando las cifras de las reservas desarrolladas de PDVSA,  es preocupante encontrar que las reservas desarrolladas, es decir aquellas reservas que tienen la posibilidad de ser producidas, pues las no desarrolladas que son inmensas, requieren de grandes inversiones para ponerlas en producción, las reservas desarrollas de los crudos livianos han descendido un 20  % desde el ano 2007 al 2011  , o sea una disminución de 932MM de barriles;  las de crudos medianos han descendido un  40%  desde el ano 2007  hasta el 2011, o sea una disminución de 1510MM de barriles, las de crudos pesados han disminuido desde el 2007 al 2011 de 5024MM de barriles a 4464MM de barriles, o sea 560MM de barriles de crudos pesados,  lo que indica una reducción de un 11%, todo esta disminución de un total de 3002MM de barriles,  y si el total de las reservas desarrollas es de 8907, indica que perdimos un 33% de nuestras reservas desarrollas, lo que crea una emergencia en la industria.
Todo esto  lo que indica es que PDVSA no esta recuperando la declinación natural de los yacimientos en producción por no incorporar al grupo de reservas desarrollas volúmenes para remplazar las reservas producidas, esto es muy preocupante pues la base de reservas desarrolladas esta llegando a niveles preocupantes, lo que hace necesario hacer inversiones muy grandes o apurar la asignación de convenios de operación u otro tipo, para recuperar la producción de los crudos livianos , medianos Y pesados,  especialmente, pues estos  constituyen aproximadamente la mas de la mitad  de la producción de Venezuela.
Compañeros si esto no les parece preocupante estamos mal,  pues la situación es muy critica.             Confiemos en que PDVSA tiene un plan para resolver este problema grave.
Cordialmente,
Néstor G Ramírez

Pd. Actualizando la información anterior.
 Lo q pdvsa hizo fue empezar a importar crudo argelino, q es super liviano, y como no pudo mantener la producción de livianos encontró la solución mas fácil, q es la de importar el liviano para mezclarlo con el pesado y tener un crudo vendible con dificultades , pero vendible.

GUYANA SE QUEDA CON LA BOCA DEL ORINOCO Y NO PASA NADA?

ESTIMADOS AMIGOS, GUYANA DIO CONCESIONES EN EL AREA DE LA BOCA DEL ORINOCO, ES DECIR EL DELTA Q ES GIGANNTE Y FALTA EL ESEQUIVO, Y DIO CONSECIONES Q NOS CIERRAN EL PASO AL ATLANTICO, Y AQUI NADIE DICE NI PIO, NI RECLAMA NADA, SON CONSECIONES PARA EXPLOTAR PETROLEO Q NO SABEMOS SI ES EXTENSION DE LA FAJA O DEL CAMPO GIGANTESCO DE PETROLEO EN MONAGAS/ANZOATEGUI DEL FURRIAL, MUSIPAN, DE VENEZUELA, POR LO QUE SE HACE URGENTE Q SE TOMEN MEDIDAS PUES GUYANA LO QUE HIZO ES ASEGURAR SU SOBERANIA SOBRE EL MAR NUESTRO DE LA BOCA DEL ORINOCO. NI SIQUIERA ESTA EN  JUEGO EL ESEQUIVO, ESO ESTA MAS LEJOS, ELLOS ESTAN AHORA EN NUESTRO TERRITORIO MARITIMO, PROPIO, Y CON LOS LIMITES ACORDADOS CON TRINIDAD NOS CIERRAN LA SALIDA AL ATLANTICO TOTALMENTE. EL DR ANIBAL MARTINEZ, ES EXPERTO EN ESTAS AREAS, TANTO DE PETROLEO COMO DE TERRITORIO  PROPIO DE VENEZUELA EN ESTA ZONA , CONSULTENLE Y VERAN Q ES PEOR LA SITUACION DE LO Q SE VE.  EL PAIS SERIO RECLAMA AL GOB Q DEFIENDA NUESTRO TERRITORIO, SINO PASARAN A SER VENDEDORES DEL PAIS, TAL COMO HICIERON CON LA GOAJIRA HACE ANOS YA, Q TODA ERA NUESTRA, Y AHORA POR LA POBRE NEGOCIACION ES DE COLOMBIA, AL PAIS LO VAN SAQUEANDO DE TERRITORIOS Y DE $, Q VAINA TAN ARRECHA ES ESTA PLAGA. SALUDOS, 
NESTOR G RAMIREZ
MIAMI, FLORIDA, USA,  15 DE MAYO 2015.

lunes, 11 de mayo de 2015

informacion sobre las exportaciones /importaciones de gas natural de los EEUU.

U.S. Natural Gas Imports & Exports 2014

With data for 2014  |  Release date: May 11, 2015  |  Next Release Date: May 2016     Print

Previous Reports


Summary

Preliminary data show a 6% increase for domestic dry natural gas production in 2014 to 25,718 billion cubic feet (Bcf), a record level for the United States. This higher level of natural gas production had the effect of displacing gross natural gas imports, which decreased by 7% in 2014 to 2,695 Bcf. As a result, net imports of natural gas (imports minus exports) in the United States fell 9% in 2014, continuing a decline that began in 2007. As has been the trend in recent years, higher domestic production of natural gas reduced U.S. reliance on foreign natural gas and kept U.S. natural gas prices lower than natural gas prices in Europe and Asia.
  five-year
average
2013 2014 2014 vs. five-year
average
2014 vs. 2013
Imports (Bcf)
Pipeline 3,095.7  2,786.5  2,635.9 -15% -5%
LNG 300.7 96.9 59.2 -80% -39%
CNG     0.3   na
Total 3,396.4 2,883.4 2,695.4 -21% -7%
Exports
Pipleline 1,341.3 1,569.4 1,492.4 11% -5%
LNG 17.5 0.2 13.6 -22% 6739%
LNG re-exports 22.4 2.7 2.7 -88% -2%
CNG   0.1 0.2   89%
Total 1,381.2 1,572.4 1,508.9 9% -4%
Net 2,015.2 1,310.9 1,186.5 -41% -9%
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, based on Office of Fossil Energy, U.S. Department of Energy.


The natural gas imports/exports market continues to undergo changes:
  • Lower natural gas imports from Canada resulted in the decline of net imports in 2014, which were 41% below the five-year average.
  • Natural gas imports to the United States, 98% of which arrive via pipeline from Canada, have decreased almost every year since 2007, and in 2014 reached the lowest level (2,636 Bcf) since January 1995.
  • Natural gas exports from the United States decreased 4% in 2014 to 1,509 Bcf, but they remained 9% above the five-year average. Natural gas exports to Mexico increased 10% in 2014, setting a record, but exports to Mexico did not offset the 16% decline of natural gas exports to Canada.
  • The United States also traded liquefied natural gas (LNG) and compressed natural gas (CNG) with its partners, but these volumes were minimal in 2014.
  five-year
average
2013 2014 2014 vs. five-year
average
2014 vs. 2013
Pipeline $0.18 $0.33 $0.18 3% -45%
LNG $5.18 $6.56 $6.81 32% 4%
CNG na na $0.03   na
Total $0.25 $0.25 $0.21 -15% -13%
Note: Henry Hub prices are available from 1997 to 2012. Except re-export prices, both import and export prices include transportation cost. LNG re-export prices are included in LNG prices.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, based on Office of Fossil Energy, U.S. Department of Energy.



The average price difference between natural gas exports and imports (price differential) was 15% lower than the five-year average at $0.21 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) in 2014. The pipeline import prices were 7% greater than the pipeline export prices in 2014 compared with 2013 prices, resulting in a net decrease of the price differential in 2014.
After 2008, the price of natural gas traded at Henry Hub in Louisiana, the national benchmark for U.S. natural gas, dropped by nearly half, to an average of $3.94/Mcf in 2009. Because most U.S. LNG import prices are linked to Henry Hub prices, LNG import prices fell by 60% to $4.59/Mcf in 2009 and have remained between $4.59/Mcf and $8.80/Mcf. Additionally, higher LNG demand from abroad, especially from Japan after the Fukushima nuclear crisis in 2011, contributed to the increase of the LNG price differential to $8.56/Mcf in 2012 and to $6.81/Mcf in 2014. However, the United States imported significantly less LNG in 2014 than in previous years, which lessened the effects of the high LNG price differential on the total average price differential.